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The Impact of Local Power Balance and Link Reliability on Blackout Risk in 
Heterogeneous Power Transmission Grids    
Abstract
Many  critical  infrastructures  such  as  the  power 
transmission grid are heterogeneous both in their basic 
structure  and  in  some  of  their  underlying 
characteristics,   This  heterogeneity  can  be  good  for 
system robustness if it reduces the spread of failures or 
bad if it adds risk or vulnerability to the system.  In this 
paper we investigate the effect of heterogeneity in the 
strength  of  the  links  between  parts  of  the  system 
network  structures,  as  well  as  the  balance  of  local 
generation and demand, on the robustness of the power 
transmission grid using the OPA complex system model 
of  the  power  transmission  system.  It  is  found  that 
increasing  or  decreasing  the  reliability  of  the  links 
between  parts  of  the  grid  changes  the  likelihood  of 
different size failures with neither being optimal for all 
sizes.   Furthermore,  imbalances  between  load  and 
generation  in  the  local  regions  further  degrades  the 
system reliability. 
1. Introduction  
Many critical infrastructure networks including 
the power transmission network exist in a wide variety 
of configurations with various inhomogeneities, but 
overall share the characteristics that they are growing 
and becoming ever more interdependent and therefore 
more critical.  Because of their importance to the 
functioning of modern society, it is essential that we 
understand their strengths and weakness so we can 
understand how to reduce their risks of failure and 
mitigate their vulnerabilities. Even within the same 
interconnection, different regions can have different 
characteristics and therefore it is important to 
understand how these regional characteristics and the 
connections between the regions can affect the risk to 
the global network.  Among the characteristics that 
may vary from region to region are the balance of 
sources and sinks (load and generation for the power 
grid) and heterogeneity of the “strength” of the links 
between regions of the network. 
Since this work explores the network robustness 
as characterized by the long-term risk of large failures 
and temporal dynamics, we use the OPA (ORNL-
PSerc-Alaska) model. The OPA model [1,2] was 
developed to study the long-term patterns of blackout 
of a power transmission system under the dynamics of 
an increasing power demand and the engineering 
responses to failure. In this model, the power demand 
is increased at a constant rate and is also modulated by 
random fluctuations. The generation capacity is 
automatically increased when the capacity margin is 
below a given critical level. The model is described 
more in the next section. 
Using the OPA model we have been able to study 
and characterize the mechanisms behind the power 
tails in the distribution of the blackout size [1,2,3]. 
These algebraic tails obtained in the numerical 
calculations are consistent with those observed in the 
study of the blackouts for real power systems [4,5,6,7]. 
Most importantly, this model permits us to separate the 
underlying causes for cascading blackouts from the 
triggers that initiate them and therefore explore system 
characteristics that enhance or degrade resilience and 
reliability of the power transmission grid.  One of these 
characteristics, the one investigated here, is the 
heterogeneity of the network. 
Many real networks have an inhomogeneous 
structure with a series of relatively homogeneous 
regions more loosely coupled to each other like pearls 
on a string. The effect of this structure and size has 
previously been investigated with OPA [8]. However 
there are many other, perhaps more important, 
inhomogeneities in these networks. For example, the 
connections between the “pearls” will often have a 
different “strength” than the connections within the 
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“pearls”.  Or, the sources and sinks may not be 
balanced within a region (“pearl”) leading to an 
underlying inhomogeneity in the flow of power.  To 
understand the impact of this type of inhomogeneity, 
we investigate  these types of configurations within a 
“pearls on a string” type of network structure using 
OPA. To do this we vary the inhomogeneities to 
determine the impact on the risk of failures of various 
sizes in networks with various number of regions and 
with various region sizes.  
To evaluate the impact of these heterogeneities 
there must be a clear separation of scales (sizes) 
between the parts of the networks and the global size. 
This makes the problem very computationally 
challenging because of the long computation times to 
compute the complex system steady state statistics and 
dynamics of large networks. 
The need for analysis and understanding of 
cascading in interconnected or coupled networks 
representing parts of the same or different 
infrastructures was recognized and described 
qualitatively in [9,10] in 2003 and 2004. The effect of 
the coupling in such systems has been studied with 
several different types of models, many of which were 
pioneered at Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences (HICSS). In 2005, [11] gave the first 
analysis with coupled probabilistic cascading 
interconnected networks and with coupled self-
organizing complex system interconnected networks. 
The analysis and simulation showed how the coupling 
could affect the critical point behavior. In 2007, [12] 
modeled cascading failure based on forest fire type 
models to study coupled networks, and in particular 
how the coupling affected the critical point and the 
power law behavior of the coupled system. In 2014, 
[13] studied a tradeoff in blackout reliability that is 
related to network size. 
In this paper, we describe the initial investigations 
and the impact on the long-term reliability of the 
system from the changes in system structure introduced 
in this model.  Section 2 will briefly review the OPA 
model while section 3 will use OPA to analyze the 
impact of varying the reliability of the links connecting 
the regions.  Section 4 investigates the propagation of 
the failures through the regions. Section 5 investigates 
the impact of load-generation imbalance within the 
regions while section 6 briefly discusses the case in 
which the power balance is added to the link reliability. 
Finally section 7 is a brief discussion and conclusion.  
2. The OPA model and the networks used  
The OPA model for the dynamics of blackouts in 
power transmission systems [1, 2] shows how the slow 
opposing forces of load growth and network upgrades 
in response to blackouts could self organize the power 
system to dynamic equilibrium.  Blackouts are 
modeled by overloads and outages of lines determined 
in the context of Linear Programming (LP) dispatch of 
a DC load flow model. This model has been found to 
show complex dynamical behavior [1,2,3] consistent 
with that found in North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC) data [5].  Some of this behavior 
has the characteristic properties of a system near a 
critical transition point.  That is, when the system is 
close to a critical point, the probability distribution 
function (PDF) of the blackout size (load shed, 
customers unserved, etc) has an algebraic tail and large 
temporal correlation lengths are possible.  One 
consequence of this behavior is that at these critical 
points, both the system utilization is maximized and 
the risk for blackouts starts to increase sharply. 
Therefore, it may be natural for power transmission 
systems to operate close to this operating point.  
 In general, the operation of power transmission 
systems results from a complex dynamical process in 
which a variety of opposing forces regulate both the 
maximum capacity of the system components and the 
loadings at which they operate. These forces interact in 
a highly nonlinear manner and may cause a self-
organization process to be ultimately responsible for 
the regulation of the system.  This view of a power 
transmission system considers not only the engineering 
and physical aspects of the power system, but also the 
engineering, economic, regulatory and political 
responses to blackouts and increases in load power 
demand.  A detailed, comprehensive inclusion of all 
these aspects of the dynamics into a single model 
would be extremely complicated if not intractable due 
to the intrinsic human interactions involved. However, 
it is useful to consider simplified models with some 
approximate overall representation of the opposing 
forces in order to gain some understanding of the 
complex dynamics in such a framework and the 
consequences for power system planning and 
operation.  This is the basis for OPA. 
In the OPA model the dynamics involves two 
intrinsic time scales. There is a slow time scale, of the 
order of days to years, over which load power demand 
slowly increases and the network is upgraded in 
engineering responses to blackouts.  These slow 
opposing forces of load increase and network upgrade 
self organize the system to a dynamic equilibrium. 
There is also a fast time scale, of the order of minutes 
to hours, over which cascading overloads or outages 
may lead to blackout. On the fast time scale we start 
from a solved base case and blackouts are initiated by 
random line outages with a probability p0. Whenever a 
line is outaged, the generation and load is re-dispatched 
using standard linear programming methods. This is 
because there is more generation power than the load 
requires and one must choose how to select and 
optimize the generation that is used to exactly balance 
the load. The cost function is weighted to ensure that 
load shedding is avoided where possible. If any lines 
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were overloaded during the optimization, then these 
lines are outaged with probability p1. The process of re-
dispatch and testing for outages is iterated until there 
are no more outages. The total load shed is, then, the 
power lost in the blackout. The p1 parameter is the 
parameter that controls the reliability or strength of a 
line and will be one of the important control 
parameters for our study. 
 The OPA model computes the long-term reliability 
taking into account the complex systems dynamics and 
feedbacks; that is, OPA is run until it converges to a 
complex systems steady state with stationary statistics 
and long time correlations. Because of the time 
correlations intrinsic to such a system, these 
simulations are different from the more common 
Monte Carlo method for generating statistics.  In the 
case of OPA, we generally run the simulation for 
longer times to generate better statistics, thereby 
sampling more of the allowed system states with the 
probabilities of sampling a given state being generated 
by the system itself. 
The main purpose of the OPA model is to study the 
complex behavior of the dynamics and statistics of 
series of blackouts in various scenarios.  This allows us 
to easily investigate the impact of different levels of 
inhomogeneity on the risk and dynamics as well as 
other network characteristics.  Despite its 
simplifications, OPA has been validated against real 
data[6] making it ideal for this type of study.  For the 
rest of the paper, OPA results are used for the 
computational analysis. 
Let us consider a series of networks build by 
linking several small networks. An example a network 
made by linking 16 100-node networks is shown in 
Fig. 1. Each of the smaller subnetworks, which we will 
refer to as zones or regions, is connected to each of its 
neighbors with three lines. We refer to this system as 
16x100.  
Each of the networks is an artificial  power network 
with realistic parameters constructed by following the 
algorithms of [14,15]. It is worth noting that Fig. 1 
should not be taken as a geographical representation 
and the length of the lines connecting the zones 
(“pearls”) is really a normal length line whose 
characteristics we will change in the next section to 
investigate the effect of heterogeneity. 
3. Reliability of links  
There are various schemes for joining the regions 
shown in Fig. 1, two of which we will call the 
intelligently built network and the simply built 
network.  The difference between them is the mean 
connection distance between nodes.  In the intelligently 
built network the connection lines are chosen to 
minimize the connection distance in the overall system. 
This is a smaller world system than the simply built 
network in which random edge nodes are connected. 
For this work, either minimizing the number of hops or 
the electrical resistance gave the same results. 
Here we consider cases (in both the simple and 
intelligent types of networks) in which the probability 
of a line outage in case of an overload of the linking 
lines, p2, is different from the probability p1 for the 
lines in the networks. We use the following notation: 
     (1) 
 For a given case the same f is applied to all the 
linking lines. For f > 1 the linking lines are more 
reliable than the standard lines since the probability of 
failure when overloaded is lower; conversely, for f  <  1 
the lines are less reliable as the probability of failure is 
higher.  There is a fairly systematic behavior of the 
rank function of the normalized load shed (LS/P) of the 
blackouts: when f  > 1 and the links are more reliable, 
the rank function, which is 1-CDF (Cumulative 
Distribution Function), is very close to the case with 
f = 1. When f < 1, less reliable links, the size of the 
blackouts are larger. This can be seen in Fig. 2. The 
effect seems to increase with the number of component 
networks.  Note that more intelligently built network, 
case A8x100, shows a more pronounced effect than the 
simply built network, case 8x100 perhaps due to the 
smaller world nature of the system giving higher 
importance to each of the connecting lines.  






This effect is not specific to the base value of p1 
chosen; for other values of p1, similar behavior is seen 
as shown in Fig. 3. 
These results were somewhat surprising because 
we expected that in both cases, increasing and reducing 
reliability of the connecting lines could have a negative 
effect on the overall system performance. The actual 
dynamics are more complex, and details that are hard 
to see in the rank function plots are important.  We 
know that increased reliability helps in allowing 
transfer of power among the components of the 
network, but it also also allows the propagation of large 
cascades.  Decreasing the reliability of the connecting 
lines can have the opposite effects. The issue is how 
these different effects contribute to the overall 
performance. 
One more detailed way of looking at this is by 
separating the blackouts in zones, the smaller 
component networks, and looking at how many zones 
are affected by the blackouts. Results are plotted in 
Fig. 4. 
From these graphs we see: 
1)  When less than 4 zones are involved, the change 
in reliability has little effect 
2)  When 5 or 6 zones are involved, high reliability 
seems better than low reliability 
3) When more than 6 zones are involved, low 
reliability seems better than high reliability. 
This suggests that the increased propagation across 
zones in the more reliably linked networks propagation 
is detrimental for large failures while the less reliably 
linked networks are more susceptible to  mid range 
number of failures.  At the small number of zone end 
the high reliability networks once again seem worse 
which could be due to the fact that the higher reliability 
networks might be letting the individual zones get 
closer to their critical point. When p1 is changed once 
again we obtain similar a result, see Fig. 5. 
Fig. 2. The rank function (1-CDF) for four 
different linked systems, each with normal 
linking line failure probability (f = 1), higher 
failure probability (f = 0.1), and lower failure 
probability (f = 10). The system A8x100 is an 
“intelligently” linked system.
Fig. 3. The rank function for an A8x100 
network, an “intelligently” linked system, 
with a higher base probability (p1 = 0.075) of 
failing when overloaded.
Fig. 4. The probability of a blackout 
occurring in a given number of zones for 
the four p1 = 0.037 cases. 

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Note that the largest load shed blackouts do not 
always correspond to the blackouts involving all zones. 
If we look at the load shed as a function of the number 
of zones included in a blackout, we see that for 3 to 6 
zones the blackout are systematically larger for f = 0.1, 
however, that is not the case for higher number of 
zones. For 8 zones, it is difficult to say anything 
because the number of events is too small. These 
results are shown in Fig. 6. 
An easier way to visualize the impact of the 
reliability is to look at the ratio of the probability of 
spreading to the various number of regions for the low 
reliability case to the high reliability case (Fig. 7). 
It can once again be seen that the probability of 
spreading to an intermediate number of zones is higher 
in the low link reliability (f = 0.1) cases, but for the 
highest and lowest number of zones risk probability is 
higher in the high link reliability (f = 10) cases. 
The effect of a higher risk of larger and smaller 
number of zones impacted by a blackout with the 
higher reliability links is independent of the size of the 
zones as seen in Fig. 8. In fact, the enhancement of the 
risk in the intermediate region (between 4 and 6 zones) 
is clearest in the 8x400 node cases.  However 
somewhat counterintuitively, as the size of the 
individual zones gets bigger, the probability of more 
zones being involved increases. This can be seen in the 
progressive flattening at the larger number of zones of 
the probability curves for all the cases as the zone size 
increases. A possible explanation for this is that as the 
zones get larger a major failure in one zone is a bigger 
perturbation to the system and is therefore more likely 
to spread, and once it spreads it again is a larger 
perturbation so the spreading is more likely to 
continue. 
Fig. 5. The probability of a blackout 
occurring in a given number of zones for the 
A8x100 network, an “intelligently” linked 
system, with a higher base probability (p1 = 
0.075) of failing when overloaded.

Fig. 6. The normalized load shed in a 
blackout affecting a given number of zones 
for an “intelligently” linked system.

Fig. 7. The ratio of probability of affecting a 
given number of zones for a low reliability to 




4. Propagation of failure  
To further investigate the dynamics of the blackouts 
in the heterogeneous networks, we can look at the 
propagation of the cascades in a failure.  Instead of 
looking at the fine structured detail of the cascades, we 
will take a coarser view and look at the cascade across 
the various regions since that is an important 
characteristic of large failures. For these cases we use 
an intelligent linked network again with 8 identical 100 
node networks.  As before this is called the A8x100 
network and again the linking between the regions is 
done with three lines as shown in Fig. 9. The linking 
busses may as before have different reliability than the 
busses in the 8 zones. For these cases we use the 
parameters: p0 = 0.00025 and p1 = 0.037. We have 
done three sets with the linking busses having the p2 
values of 0.37 (low reliability links), 0.037 (normal), 
and 0.0037 (high reliability links) respectively. 
First we explore the high reliability set.  To look at 
the propagation, we choose two representative specific 
times with cascades that have the maximum number of 
zones involved in the blackout. 
 Case I: p2 = 0.0037 for linking lines at time 33444 
in the evolution 
In this case, all 8 zones of the network are involved. 
The load shed normalized to the power demand in each 
of the 8 zones is higher than 0.00001, our criterion for 
declaring a blackout. This is shown in Table I. 
Table I. Load shed normalized to the power 
demand in each of the 8 zones  
This blackout goes through 11 iterations and one 
way to see the propagation is by looking at the number 
of overloaded lines in each zone at each iteration. Fig. 
10 shows these results. We can see that the initiation is 
in zones 5, 6 and 7. Note that in this blackout there 
were 4 simultaneous failures due to p0 as initiation 
event. Then, we can see that it very rapidly propagates 
across all other zones. As can be seen in table I, there 
was the largest load-shed in the initiating zones 5 and 
6, but there was also a significant load shed in the other 
zones where the blackout propagated, such as zones 1 
and 8. 
Fig. 8. The probability of a blackout 
occurring in a given number of zones for 3 
“intelligently” linked systems, all with 8 
zones of sizes 100, 200 and 400.  The effect 
is seen in all but there is a noticeable 




Fig. 9. The A8x100 network.













Z o n e 
7
Z o n e 
8
0.0243 0.005230.007120.004370.232 0.129 0.0475 0.0694
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If we look now at the linking lines, the main 
overloads are on the lines linking zones 4 to 5, and 8 to 
1. These are the links between the region where the 
failure was initiated and the rest of the network. This is 
shown in Fig. 11. 
Case II: p2 = 0.0037 for linking lines at time 81395 
in the evolution 
This case is interesting because even though the 
initiating events were only in two of the zones, zone 1 
and zone 8, it still propagated to the other six zones of 
the network. The load sheds for each of the zones are 
shown in Table II. 
Table II. Load shed normalized to the power 
demand in each of the 8 zones  
The propagation is again seen through the change 
of the number of overloaded lines in each zone as 
shown in Fig. 12. 
We can see that the event initiates in zones 1 and 8 
with some impact already apparent in the first iteration 
in zone 7. This then propagates through the system 
with the largest load shed in this case being in zone 3, 
where the blackout lasted longer. All zones were 
seriously affected in this case also. Lines linking zones 
2 and 3 and zones 7 and 8 were the most affected by 
this blackout. Again these are the main lines 
Fig. 10. Number of overloaded lines vs 
iteration for each zone during a blackout 
showing the propagation across the zones.

Fig. 11. Number of connecting lines 
overloaded vs iteration for each zone during 
a blackout showing the propagation across 
the zones.

Z o n e 
1
Z o n e 
2
Z o n e 
3
Z o n e 
4
Z o n e 
5
Z o n e 
6
Z o n e 
7
Z o n e 
8
0.1165 0.0801 0.1343 0.0286 0.0506 0.0259 0.0941 0.111
Fig. 12. Number of overloaded lines vs 
iteration for each zone during a blackout 
showing the propagation across the zones.

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connecting the initiating region to the rest.  This is 
shown in Fig. 13. 
Next we briefly look at the low reliability set.  In 
this case we will look at one specific cascade, again 
with the maximum number of zones involved in the 
blackout.  Because of this it looks very similar to the 
high reliability cases and is included mainly for 
completeness. 
 Case I: p2 = 0.37 for linking lines at time 41260 in 
the evolution 
This case has initiating events in two of the zones, 
zone 6 and zone 7, and it too propagated to the other 
six zones of the network in 10 iterations.  
The propagation is seen through the change of the 
number of overloaded lines in each zone as shown in 
Fig. 14. One interesting point to note in this cascade is 
that the maximum impact was in zone 3 but much later 
in the cascade at iteration 6 and after having peaked in 
zone 5 earlier. It is also worth noting that because of 
the nonlocal nature of the electrical power 
transmission, the propagation does not need to be 
through nearest neighbors or even through neighboring 
zones. 
5. Load - Generation balance  
 We next consider the inhomogeneity of an 
imbalance of power within the zones. In these 
investigations we will again use the 8x100 networks. 
We will use both the simple 8x100 and the intelligent 
A8x100 linked network. The imbalance initially 
investigated is an excess load (demand) in zone 4 and 
an excess generation (supply) in zone 6. Figure 15 
shows the rank functions for the two networks (simple 
on the left and intelligent on the right) as the imbalance 
is varied.  The simple network loses the self-similar 
nature of the rank function for values of imbalance of 
~0.5 as the large events grow rapidly.  Impact on the 
intelligently linked network is also significant but the 
self-similarity remains although the tail gets much 
heavier.  
Fig. 13. Number of connecting lines 
overloaded vs iteration for each zone.
Fig. 14. Number of overloaded lines vs 
iteration for each zone during a blackout 
showing the propagation across the 
zones.

Fig. 15. Rank functions for the 8x100 and 
A8x100 networks as the power imbalance in 
the networks  is varied.

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In Fig. 16 we see the statistical quantities, <M> and 
the frequency of blackouts. <M> is the average 
fractional loading of the line, where 1 would be lines at 
their limit and 0 would be a line with no load. For both 
types of network there is a significant change in both 
measures.  However the changes are very different for 
the two networks.  For the simple network, the 
frequency increases by more then 60% and <M> 
increases by ~ 30%.  This, combined with the rank 
functions suggests that for the largest imbalance the 
simple network is continuously collapsing. In contrast, 
the intelligently linked network has a small decrease in 
frequency and a more modest increase in <M>.  This, 
combined with the rank functions suggests that with 
the imbalance, the intelligently linked network  is 
negatively impacted. However, the intelligently linked 
network is much more resilient to the imbalance.  
There are different ways of doing intelligent 
linking, all of which reduce the averaged distance 
between nodes. Figure 17 shows that the different 
degrees of intelligent linking do not affect the rank 
function of the balanced case; however it is important 
in the unbalanced cases. 
For all the cases presented, the two imbalanced 
zones were zones 4 and 6.  A reasonable question asks 
what would be the effect of changing the separation 
between the imbalanced zones.  Figure 18 shows that 
for the rank function, the effect of changing the 
separation is small.  L4 G4 is the balanced case, L4 G6 
is the case we have been looking at, L4 G5 are closer 
together and L4 G8 is the maximum separation. We see 
that the rank function does not change much with the 
separation between the enhanced load and the 
enhanced generation though they all are significantly 
changed from the balanced cases. 
6. Connection reliability and generation 
imbalance  
Preliminary work combining the reliability of the 
links and the load-generation imbalance shows that as 
the unbalance increases the effect of the reliability of 
the zones connecting lines is less important (Fig. 19). 
This is likely because the impact of the load imbalance 
dominates. 
6. Conclusion  
Because of the efficiency gains of having larger 
systems it is natural for multiple smaller regions to be 
connected together.  Though this gives the benefit of 
being able to share power across the boundaries, it also 
allows problems (blackouts) to be shared (to 
propagate) across these boundaries.  The way these 
smaller regions are connected can incorporate 
heterogeneities into the system which can impact the 
dynamics of the failures. Using a complex systems 
power transmission grid model (OPA) to investigate 
the impact of grid inhomogeneity on the system, our 
analysis suggests that adding heterogeneity in the form 
of changed reliability of the links between zones can 
have a significant impact on the risk of failures of 
different sizes. Interestingly, increasing the reliability 
of the links decreases the risk of mid range failures but 
increases the risk of large (and small) failures. 
Conversely, decreasing the reliability of the linking 
Fig. 16. Frequency and average line loading 
as a function of the power imbalance for the 
two networks showing large changes but 
differing for the two networks.

Fig. 17. Rank functions for balanced and 
unbalanced cases as the average nodal 
distance is changed. All the intelligently links 
cases look the same but in the unbalanced 
case the intelligent linking makes a 
signiﬁcant difference to the tail.

Fig. 19. Rank functions for the unbalanced 
and inhomogeneous link reliability cases. 
With increased imbalance (right panel) the 
effect of the reliability is less visible.

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lines decreases the risk of large failures but increases 
the risk of mid size failures.   A likely mechanism for 
this is that the failure size and the reliability of the 
links both affect the propagation of the failures 
between the different zones. This overall effect is 
found to be insensitive to size of the individual parts, 
but the probability of propagation through the system 
does increase as the individual zones get larger. It 
should also be noted that the rules for power dispatch 
are system-wide in our present implementation and if 
dispatch were weighted toward the local zone, that too 
could have an impact on the results.  It should be 
mentioned that the apparent heterogeneity in Fig. 1 is 
just an artifact of how the system is illustrated. If the 
linking lines are constructed to minimize distance, the 
overall system is ver close to a homogeneous system of 
the same size.  It is not until the linking lines are 
changed (through length or reliability changes) that we 
start to see a real impact of heterogeneity.  
Additional inhomogeneities in the form of 
imbalances in the power in the different zones in the 
system significantly added to the risk in the system but 
the construction of the system greatly changed that 
impact. The power balance issues include a real load/
generation imbalance causing systematic long-distance 
power transfers such that one region (zone) is not 
locally in balance and imports power from other 
regions in the base case operation.  This has a large 
impact on the risk of large failures.  
Because the impacts are varied, this suggests that 
the natural islanding between zone that the linking 
lines may cause do not on their own improve the 
reliability of the overall system.  Therefore a natural 
next step will be to investigate policies or smart agents 
controlling the islanding schemes to see if we can get 
the best of both worlds by cutting the zones apart when 
appropriate to halt the spread of the failures.  
It is clear that inhomogeneities can have a number 
of impacts on the system robustness and reliability 
coming from both the inhomogeneity in the network 
structure and in the power flows across the 
inhomogeneous network. These seem to work together 
to move the system closer to or perhaps even past its 
critical point leading to a heavy tail or even a bump on 
the tail blackout (failure) size distribution with the 
increased large blackout risk inherent in those 
distributions.  
While the work presented here is specifically for a 
single type of infrastructure (the power transmission 
grid as modeled by OPA) that has an inhomogeneous 
structure, similar results likely would hold for coupled 
infrastructures where the inhomogeneity arises from 
the coupling.  
  
Acknowledgements 
BAC thanks the financial support of Universidad 
Carlos III and Banco Santander through a Càtedra de 
Excelencia. ID gratefully acknowledges support in part 
of this work by NSF grant CPS-1135825. 
7. References  
      
[1] B.A. Carreras, V.E. Lynch, I. Dobson, D.E. Newman, 
Complex dynamics of blackouts in power transmission 
systems, Chaos, vol. 14, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 643-652. 
[2] I. Dobson, B.A. Carreras, V.E. Lynch, D.E. Newman 
Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 
vol. 17, no. 2, June 2007. 
[3] D.E. Newman, B.A. Carreras, V.E. Lynch, I. Dobson, 
Exploring complex systems aspects of blackout risk and 
mitigation, IEEE Trans. Reliability, vol. 60, no. 1, March 
2011, pp. 134-143.  
[4] B. A. Carreras, D. E. Newman, I. Dobson, and A. B. 
Poole, Evidence for self organized criticality in a time series 
of electric power system blackouts, IEEE Transactions on 
Circuits and Systems Part I, 51, 1733 (2004).  
[5] P. Hines, J. Apt, S. Talukdar, Large blackouts in North 
America: Historical trends and policy implications, Energy 
Policy, vol.37, 2009, pp. 5249-5259. 
[6] B.A. Carreras, D.E. Newman, I. Dobson, N.S. Degala, 
Validating OPA with WECC data, Forty-sixth Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, Maui, Hawaii, 
January 2013. 
[7] Xingyong Zhao, Xiubin Zhang, and Bin He, Study on self 
organized criticality of China power grid blackouts, Energy 
conservation and Management,  vol. 50, no. 3,March 2009. 
[8] B.A. Carreras, D.E. Newman,  I. Dobson, The Impact of 
Size and Inhomogeneity on Power Transmission Network 
Complex System Dynamics, 47th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, January 2014. 
[9] R. G. Little, Toward More Robust Infrastructure: 
Observations on Improving the Resilience and Reliability of 
Critical Systems, 36th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, HI 2003. 
[10] S. M. Rinaldi, Modeling and Simulating Critical 
Infrastructures and Their Interdependencies, 37th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, Big Island, HI, 
USA, January 2004. 
[11] D. E. Newman, B. Nkei, B. A. Carreras, I. Dobson, V. E. 
Lynch, P. Gradney, Risk assessment in complex interacting 
infrastructure systems, 38th Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences, Hawaii, January 2005. 
[12] B.A. Carreras, D.E. Newman, P. Gradney, V.E. Lynch, I. 
Dobson, Interdependent risk in interacting infrastructure 
systems, 40th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, Hawaii, January 2007. 
[13] B.A. Carreras, D.E. Newman, I. Dobson, Does size 
matter?, Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear 
Science 24 (2), 023104 (2014) 
[14]  Z.  Wang,  R.J.  Thomas,  and A.  Scaglione,  Generating 
random  topology  power  grids,  41st  Hawaii  International 
Conference on System Sciences, Jan. 2008.
[15]  Z. Wang, A. Scaglione, and R. Thomas, “Generating 
statistically correct random topologies for testing smart grid 
communication and control networks”, IEEE Trans. on Smart 
Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010. 
2593
